The double play: simultaneous speculative attacks on currency and equity markets by Sujit Chakravorti & Subir Lall

















This paper investigates the potential for foreign speculators to profit from simultaneously taking 
short positions in foreign exchange and equity markets under a fixed exchange rate regime, in 
what has been termed as the “double play.”  Such a strategy is considered when the monetary 
authority is faced with two conflicting objectives—exchange rate stability and low interest rates. 
While the monetary authority may not be able to directly intervene to stabilize interest rates 
under the fixed exchange rate regime, it may consider intervention in equity markets to head off 
speculative pressure on interest rates.  The model determines market conditions where 
speculators may find the double play strategy profitable and the impact of government 
intervention on speculative short equity positions and the interest rate, concluding that 
intervention can never simultaneously reduce speculation in the equity and the money markets. 
In the case where country fundamentals are strong, intervention while reducing short positions in 
equity markets actually increases short positions in the money market and induces higher interest 
rates.  The paper concludes by discussing the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s intervention in 
the Hong Kong equity market within the context of this model.         
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The 1997-99 crises in emerging markets has again focused attention on fixed exchange 
rate regimes and the techniques used by authorities to defend the regime.  The dramatic collapse 
of several Asian currencies, followed by the devaluation of the Brazilian real in 1999, has 
highlighted the difficult policy choices that authorities face when their currencies are under 
strong speculative pressures.  
Innovations in financial markets and the accompanying proliferation of instruments have 
increased the channels through which investors can take positions on expected asset price 
movements in emerging markets.  In times of crisis, a high degree of volatility has often been 
transmitted through various markets, posing a dilemma for national authorities in pursuing their 
policy objectives, which have typically included exchange rate and financial market stability, as 
well as broader macroeconomic objectives such as growth and price stability. 
While the classic speculative attack takes place through on-balance sheet sales of 
domestic currency and other domestic assets converted into foreign exchange, alternative 
positions can be taken in markets for other assets such as domestic stocks and bonds, 
international stocks and bonds, as well as a variety of derivatives such as currency forwards and 
futures, equity and bond futures, options and total rate of return swaps.  While the typical 
defense of a speculative attack has meant a combination of spot foreign exchange intervention 
and an interest rate defense, when strong pressures have been felt in markets and instruments 
other than domestic credit, national authorities have in some cases been tempted to intervene 




Some of these interventions have involved alternate uses of foreign exchange reserves 
such as to buy equity or to buy back outstanding debt, or impositions of restrictions on the 
mobility of capital.  Since the beginning of the Asian crisis in mid-1997, several countries have 
adopted such unorthodox interventions, raising questions about the implications of such 
intervention for the behavior of market participants and asset prices in the future (see 
International Monetary Fund 1999).  The line distinguishing orthodox from unorthodox 
interventions is by definition elastic. 
This paper focuses on one such unorthodox intervention.  Specifically, the rationale for 
intervention by a central bank in its stock market under a strict fixed exchange regime is 
investigated.  A notable case of such intervention was by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in 
August 1998.
2  The model presented allows speculators to take both long and short positions in 
equity and money markets subject to a constraint on their access to credit needed for emplacing 
such positions.  Conditions under which a “double play” i.e. a simultaneous shorting of equity 
and currency/money markets may be a potentially profitable strategy are considered.  
Speculators attempt to influence interest rates by demanding domestic currency credit to profit 
from the potential negative effect the consequent interest rate rise would have on equity markets, 
having already established short equity positions beforehand.  
The monetary authority is an entity whose primary objective is the maintenance of the 
exchange rate regime, but it also has a distaste for interest rate increases and losses from equity 
market intervention.  The model determines what the optimal equity market intervention of the 
central bank would be under such circumstances, and what the resultant speculative positions are 




government intervention in the equity market is only effective in lowering interest rates if the 
fundamentals are weak to begin with.  Furthermore, government intervention increases short 
positions in the equity markets under such a scenario.  Alternatively, if the fundamentals are 
relatively strong, government intervention into equity markets does not lower interest rates.  
This paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we briefly discuss the speculative 
attack literature.  In section 3, we construct a two-period model that incorporates intervention in 
the equity market.  In section 4, we discuss policy implications of such a policy.  In section 5, we 
analyze the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s August 1998 intervention in their equity markets 
within the context of our model.  Finally, in section 6, we conclude. 
 
II. The Speculative Attack Literature 
The initial speculative attack literature considered a small country with limited foreign 
reserves and predicted the timing of collapse of the exchange rate regime (see Krugman (1979) 
and Flood and Garber (1984)).  This literature has been developed in several different directions, 
including the possibility of self-fulfilling attacks (the so-called Type II models) and central banks 
with preference functions. 
Even if successful, the defense of a pegged exchange rate has its costs, most notably high 
domestic interest rates.  Bensaid and Jeanne (1994) suggest that defending the peg is costly for 
the monetary authority and this cost alone may provide incentives to abandon the peg.  Since 
speculators are aware of these incentives to abandon the peg, they continue to attack the 
currency.  Bensaid and Jeanne use their model to explain some features of the 1992-93 EMS 
crisis. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 Numerous country authorities have at various points in time intervened in equity markets to support policy 




Furthermore, the literature had emphasized intervention in the spot foreign exchange 
market but more recently, Lall (1997) considered intervention by monetary authorities in the 
forward foreign exchange market and studied the impact of such an intervention on the domestic 
interest rate.  He modeled a central bank that was averse to interest rate squeezes, and also was 
constrained by the losses it could take on its capital through its intervention in spot and forward 
markets.  Obstfeld (1996), Ozkan and Sutherland (1995), and Drazen and Masson (1994) have 
also constructed models where a monetary authority’s loss function is minimized.    
 
III. THE MODEL 
 
We model the attack on the exchange rate and equity markets as an interaction between 
the monetary authority and speculators.  Speculators are profit-maximizing entities that intend 
to maximize their profits from taking positions in one or more of the money- and  equity 
markets.  The monetary authority operates the exchange rate arrangement.  Its primary goal is 
to fix the exchange rate, but it also has a distaste for deviations of the interest rate from a target 
interest rate.  Thus, while doing all it can to maintain the exchange rate, within this broad bound 
it may choose to undertake other policy actions such as equirty market intervention to minimize 
the interest rate squeezes that may be needed to defend the exchange rate.  While one could 
consider a strict currency board arrangement as one where the monetary authority has no control 
on interest rates i.e. it is an endogenous variable, that framework is somewhat compatible with a 
monetary authority that has a distaste for interest rates volatility, because a currency board has to 
be agnostic to interest rate movements.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    




Speculators who can foresee that the authority will follow a policy that produces a sharp 
interest rate response, because of the primary objective of defending the exchange rate, may want 
to trigger such an automatic response, to profit from price movements that the interest rate 
volatility generates on other asset markets￿specifically the equity market.  What then can a 
monetary authority do to maintain the exchange rate regime while limiting interest rate 
volatility?  It may try to reduce the profitability of speculating in the equity market through 
directly intervening there, and therefore taking pressure away from interest rates, as speculators 
in a perfect foresight world would find such equity market speculation unprofitable.  The basic 
question then becomes: does such intervention in the equity market reduce (a) rises in interest 
rates; and (b) speculation i.e. short selling, in equity and money markets. 
For analytical tractability, we rely on an exogenous random event to drive the ultimate 
demise of the exchange rate regime and set up the model in a way that separates and isolates the 
various phenomena that occur in the very short term money and asset markets during a 
speculative attack.  Under normal circumstances, given the monetary authority’s preference, it 
will do all it can to maintain the exchange rate, i.e. raise interest rates as high as needed, 
intervene using its reserves, and borrow unlimited amounts to intervene.  It is clear that a 
combination of any two of the above three can be used to defend an exchange rate indefinitely, 
and the regime would not have to collapse at the time of the attack.  In other words, the central 
bank will not willingly give up the exchange rate regime.  
To analyze the question at the heart of this paper, i.e. what will the central banks do 
within that broad policy constraint to minimize the pain of an interest rate squeeze, we allow for 
the possibility that regardless of the central bank’s motives, the exchange rate may nevertheless 




period wherein a random shock to domestic credit can occur as in Lall (1997) (this could be the 
imminent collapse of (a) large domestic bank(s) that would then need an extension of credit to 
keep it afloat, which is a channel to introduce uncertainty in the path of domestic credit as in 
Flood and Garber (1984)), and where the central bank’s access to lines of credit is limited at that 
point.  One interpretation of such a framework is that while the central bank has access to lines 
of credit to defend its currency against an attack by speculators, it will not have access to such 
lines to bail out a domestic financial entity whose collapse may be imminent.  
 
A. Speculators’ objective function 
Speculators are profit-maximizing agents, whose profits are given by the sum of the gains 
from their capital invested in the equity market and that invested in the money markets.  Under 
this model’s framework we want to analyze the attacks on equity markets in the case where no 
one expects the currency to collapse due to their actions, i.e. the existing institutional 
mechanisms will allow the central bank to defend the exchange rate against speculation, and the 
central bank’s behavior is predictable.  This model does not consider the case where the central 
bank considers a surprise one-off nonstandard response to speculation.  Both the central bank 
and speculators know that the collapse of the exchange rate is going to be dependent solely on 
the exogenous credit shock, and speculators are trying to manipulate the equity market given 
everyone’s (identical) expectations on the credit shock and hence the expected future exchange 
rate, to profit from their equity positions.  
The individual speculator’s optimization problem is the following:  
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The profit on an equity position is given by the first part of equation (1) and the profit on a fixed 
income (i.e. local currency credit) position is given by the second part.  The capital constraint 
limits the overall value of the speculator’s position. C can also be interpreted as the limit on 
access to credit that the speculator has, that can be a multiple of its capital in the case where the 
speculator is employing leverage.  
A necessary condition for profitable long positions in equities (i.e. when x>0) is: 
 
i.e. the stock market has to rise (fall) by a factor greater (less) than any depreciation 
(appreciation) of the currency. 
  Conversely, a necessary condition for a profitable short position in equities (i.e. when 















i.e. the proportionate fall (rise) in the stock index has to be greater (less) than the appreciation 
(depreciation) of the currency.  
 
B. Market power and the ability to manipulate equity prices 
An argument frequently made by market observers with regard to emerging markets is 
that the relatively small size of the market allows large leveraged international players to 
manipulate market prices and profit from this manipulation.
3  While the history of financial 
markets is replete with market corners and bear squeezes, the argument does not apply easily in 
the current context.
4  Price manipulation in and of itself stemming from having a large position 
can be profitable if the (or a group of) large player owns or controls the supply of the asset, and 
may have a claim on it.  In a typical market corner, an entity that owns a large segment of the 
market in an asset, and then provides it to others for shortselling, can profit by raising the prices 
in that asset, while demanding delivery of the same asset it is owed, which is a typical bear 
squeeze.
5  
From the point of view of a large leveraged player in a small emerging market, the ability 
to manipulate prices for profit is not as easily apparent.  For instance, while this player may be 
able to bid equity prices up as a result of being able to purchase a large chunk of the market’s 
free float, the very act of closing out these positions in the absence of actions by other market 
                                                             
3 This argument has generally been targeted at hedge funds and the proprietary desks of large commercial and 
investment banks. 














players would, for the same reasons, drive prices back down, not allowing the speculator to profit 
from the ability to affect prices.  Similarly, while short selling may drive prices down, the 
closing out of the short positions would move them symmetrically the other way i.e. back up, not 
allowing profits from short selling.  The player could only profit if it can move prices a certain 
way, and then in addition convince others that prices should move even more in that direction, so 
that it can close out positions while other market participants are still moving in the opposite 
direction.  As an example, a player may start buying a particular stock, and then convince others 
that its price will rise even more, and then close out its position by selling the stock at a higher 
price, while others are still buying.  
While this is certainly a potentially profitable way to manipulate markets, it is not related 
to market power and size.  In fact, it is trivial to see that this strategy of price manipulation is 
more profitable in large liquid markets rather than small illiquid ones, because the speculator 
would like to emplace its position without moving prices at all as profits are lower if it is 
acquiring positions while market prices are moving in response to its own position-taking.  Being 
able to convince other market players to take positions to move prices in a direction while 
oneself taking the opposite position is not related to size of the player, but to possible 
informational inefficiencies in a market.  In fact, any player large or small can exploit these 
inefficiencies and the smaller player would profit more than a larger player from this. 
Since the size of market players is at best irrelevant in enabling them to profitably 
manipulate prices in a small and illiquid market￿and more realistically puts them at a 
disadvantage￿, speculators’ market power and size is not a variable that can affect equity prices 
in this model. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    





C. Affecting equity prices through the interest rate impact 
The other remaining channel through which equity prices can be “manipulated” is 
through interest rates.  Empirical evidence and a vast theoretical literature document the negative 
impact of interest rates on equity prices.
6  If there is any way that market participants can raise 
interest rates and maintain them at a high level, so that equity prices fall, then short selling may 
be a profitable strategy.  However, for this channel to work, equity markets would again have to 
be deep and liquid, so that the closing out of positions would not move prices against the 
speculators. 
There are two broad channels for raising interest rates by market participants in a 
currency board regime: 
 
•  A large spot sale of the currency would force an automatic contraction in the monetary 
base, bidding up interest rates. 
•  A squeeze in the interbank and/or money market would take liquidity out of the banking 
system and force interest rates up. 
 
For purposes of this model, we assume that speculators have the ability to influence interest rates 
through demand for domestic credit that they can generate i.e. speculators can suddenly begin to 
demand huge amounts of credit from the money markets, which will then feed through to the 
                                                             
6 It may be useful to note that it is rarely the overnight interest rate that has a strong impact on equity valuations.  In 
the United States, market analysts typically focus on the 10-year US Treasury bond as the most important indicator. 
Furthermore, the impact of temporary shocks to the interest rate on equity prices is generally negligible.  However, 
for purposes of investigating the double play strategy, we assume that even a temporary shock has some impact on 




central bank.  The size of this position in the money market will determine in equilibrium what 
the interest rates are.  
  
D. The probability of an exchange rate collapse 
To compute the probability of collapse of the exchange rate regime, and the exchange 
rate after the collapse, this paper uses the standard monetary model of the exchange rate.  The 


































and  0 a and  1 a are constants and strictly positive.  
The equations represent the fact that the change in money supply is the sum of changes in 
reserves and the shock to domestic credit; the equilibrium between real money demand and 
money supply, and the purchasing power parity assumption.  If the exchange rate were to 
collapse at t+1’, the central bank would set the interest rate at the target level  r. 
The shadow post-collapse exchange rate based on the above system is given by: 
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This can be rewritten as: 
 
Thus, the probability of the collapse of the exchange rate is simply the probability that the 
random shock to domestic credit in the terminal period exhausts all the reserves of the monetary 
authority because -DR(t+1) which is the change in reserves from t+1, can never exceed the 
reserve stock of the country.  The expectation at time t of the exchange rate at t+1 will then be 
given by: 
 
E. No Central Bank Equity Market Intervention  
The benchmark case is one where the central bank is not concerned about interest rate volatility 
and simply reacts to changes in the demand for credit in an automatic fashion. 
.
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Determination of equity prices 
The expected stock price in the next period is a function of: 
 
where: F is a set of exogenous fundamentals positively related to the level of the equity market 
(such as corporate earnings) while r, the interest rate, is negatively related. 
We assume the following simple linear form: 
r F S t t 3 1 2 1 f f - = + + ,                    (2) 
where: 
N2 ” the weight of fundamentals on the future stock price, 
N3 ” the weight of the realized interest rate on the future stock price, 
 
0 < N2, N3  # 1.  
 
 
In a strict fixed exchange rate regime, if international price levels are constant, then domestic 
price levels can not change.  One way to consider this if domestic money supply has to remain 
invariant, i.e. interest rates will move fully in response to shocks to money demand.  These 
relationships can be expressed as: 
1 + = t t M M , 
and  
r a a y a r a a 1 0 2 1 0 - = - - . 
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Optimal speculative attack 
We now solve for the optimal values of x and y. Substituting equations (2) and (3) into 
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subject to: 
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            (6) 
For y to be negative, the terms inside the bracket in the numerator must be positive.  If y is 
negative, x has to be greater than –C. The double play in this formulation could be a trading 
strategy that players can implement to potentially profit from simultaneously shorting the equity 
                                                             




and currency markets. There are ranges within which it is profitable to short both the equity and 
money markets.  
 
F. Central Bank Equity Market Intervention 
Now, we consider a direct equity market intervention by the monetary authority.  To limit 
the increase in the interest rate, the monetary authority intervenes in the equity market to prevent 
speculators from bidding up the interest rate and profiting from short positions in the equity 
markets.  In addition to a distaste for deviations of the interest rate from its target interest rate, 
the central bank also has a distaste for expected losses on its capital from its intervention. The 
loss function can be written as: 
2
1 ) ( ) ( r r S S Z L t - + - =
+
+ b ,                                                                                         (7) 
where: 
Z  ” the monetary authority’s long position in the equity market, 
S
+” the expected value of a stock or an equity index at the time the monetary authority unwinds 
its position 
 
This setup also assumes that the losses from intervention (in currency and equity 
markets) is always lower than the infinite cost of abandoning the regime.  The central bank’s 
optimal intervention will be derived from the minimization of this loss function.  
 
Determination of equity prices 
Equity prices are assumed to vary as: 
 




The price appreciation of equity will depend upon the fundamentals and the interest rate that has 
prevailed in the period that the stock or index is being held in addition to the intervention impact:  
r F Z S t t 3 1 2 1 1 f f f - + = + + .                (8)   
 
Combining equations (7) and (8) yields:  
2
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The central bank will minimize the above loss function with respect to Z, yielding the following 
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Optimal speculative attack 

















































































































C y x £ + . 



























































































































          (13) 
                                                             




































































         
 
Comparing equation (13) with equation (6) we find that the speculator shorts the equity market 




1 F Ft > +                       (14) 
 
This suggests that ceteris paribus government intervention in equity markets will reduce short 
positions taken in equity markets when fundamentals are stronger to begin with.  However, in 
such a case, the speculator will short the money market more.  Such a result is intuitive given 
that if fundamentals are strong, investors would need to devote a greater proportion of their 
capital to pressuring the money market enough to get a bigger interest rate increase to get a 
comparable move on equity prices.  Therefore for strong fundamentals, i.e. for  
~
1 F Ft > + , and 






y , and 
~
r , we find: 
~
xx >    (less short positions in the equity market) 
~





rr >     (higher interest rates) 
 
 
If fundamentals are weak, on the other hand, resources are better spent in shorting the equity 
market relative to the money market, as it takes less of an interest rate rise to cause a comparable 
(expected) downward move in equity prices.  The monetary authority faces a tradeoff between 
speculators either taking short positions in the equity markets or the money markets. 
 
Therefore, interventions in the equity market produce several key outcomes: the monetary 
authority can never simultaneously reduce short positions in both equity and money markets, and 
hence can not mitigate speculation. If fundamental are strong, intervention reduces short equity 
market  positions, but increase money market shorts and higher interest rates. If fundamentals are 
weak, intervention increases equity market short positions even more, but reduced money market 
short positions and interest rate spikes.  
   
  IV. IMPLICATIONS OF EQUITY MARKET INTERVENTION AND THE DOUBLE PLAY 
  We now analyze the implications of this simple model. Our model on the double-play 
strategy yields the following implications.  First, the strategy of shorting the money and equity 
markets simultaneously may result from the expectation of speculators that the currency will 
depreciate and the economic fundamentals are weak.  Although there may be instances under 
which speculators would short both markets absent these conditions, government intervention 




will government intervention in the equity market lead to lower interest rates.  However, such a 
policy will also increase short positions in the equity markets.  
Furthermore, such interventions may lead to undesirable long-run consequences.  First, 
the unwinding of large equity positions by the government may lead to downward pressure on 
equity prices at a later date.  Second, because governments may not be particularly good at 
predicting future equity prices, such a strategy is potentially associated with large financial losses 
if future equity prices fall. Third, government intervention may also lead to artificially high 
equity prices because of the artificial floor created by such intervention.  Fourth, such policies 
may increase regulatory uncertainty that in turn may have the consequence of making foreign 
investment less attractive.  As our model demonstrates, even the short-term benefits are 
questionable at best. 
  
V. HKMA’S INTERVENTION IN THE EQUITY MARKETS 
 
An example of intervention in the equity market is the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s 
(HKMA) purchase of stocks and futures. Between August 14 and 28, 1998, HKMA bought a 
total of some $15 billion in stocks and futures in the Hong Kong equity market, which 
constituted 7 percent of the capitalization and between 20 and 35 percent of the free float of the 
Hang Seng index.
9  This intervention in the equity market was at the time viewed by a wide 
variety of market participants as a significant departure from Hong Kong's traditional free market 
principles and clearly took the markets by surprise.
10 
                                                             
9 The portfolio is currently held by the Exchange Fund Investment Limited (EFIL), according to strict guidelines to 
avoid interference with the day-to-day commercial activities of the companies. The portfolio was worth some $26.7 
billion following the Hong Kong market’s 85 percent rise between September 1998 and end-June 1999. 
10 However, under severe pressures in 1987, the authorities had temporarily shut down the stock market altogether 




The Hong Kong authorities have explained their stock market intervention as being 
targeted at a specific group of speculators that were manipulating Hong Kong's equity and 
foreign exchange markets for profit in what was termed a “double play,” i.e. a simultaneous 
attack on equity and currency markets (see Tsang 1998).  The authorities perceived certain 
players as selling Hong Kong dollars to drive up interest rates￿ taking advantage of the 
adjustment mechanism of Hong Kong's linked exchange rate arrangement￿ and depress stock 
prices, thus generating profits on previously established substantial short positions in the equity 
cash and futures markets.
11 Certain players were also said to have spread rumors in the market 
about a Chinese devaluation and its knock-on effect on Hong Kong, and about a collapse of the 
Hong Kong equity and property markets, to generate selling pressures on the Hong Kong dollar 
and the stock market. According to the authorities, the speculative attack “was a contrived game 
with clearly destructive goals in mind...[to] drive up interest rates, drive down share prices, make 
the local population panic and exert enough pressure on the linked exchange rate until it breaks” 
(Tsang 1998). 
However, some market participants noted that at the time of the pressures, there were 
fundamental reasons to sell off Hong Kong equity holdings and the Hong Kong dollar. As of 
August 1998, the Hong Kong economy was heading into its deepest recession in 23 years with 
recently released figures showing first quarter GDP having shrunk 2.8 percent year-on-year. 
Other data released around that time showed unemployment at a 15-year high of 4.5 percent, a 
halving in property prices, and seven consecutive months of falls in retail sales year-on-year. 
                                                             
11 According to the authorities, some of these sales of Hong Kong dollars may have been facilitated by “prefunding” 
in the swap market, that is, engaging in swaps to access Hong Kong dollars that multilateral organizations had raised 
through their bond issuances.  Multilateral agencies, including inter alia the World Bank Group, the Asian 
Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, issued HK$36.6 billion (equivalent of US$4.7 billion) worth of bonds in the period January-August 




Corporate earnings reports had also created a negative sentiment in markets. Reflecting these 
factors and the general speculative pressures in the region, by August 11 the Hang Seng 
Index (HSI) had slumped 36 percent in 1998, to its lowest level since January 1993.   
Furthermore, Asian markets were close to their lowest levels since the onset of the Asian 
crisis in July 1997 and the outlook for the region was bleak.  For example, the IFC Global index 
for Asia had declined in dollar terms by 60 percent over this period.  Regional sentiment was 
very poor, the affected Asian countries were mired in a deep recession, and foreign investors 
were cutting back their exposures to emerging markets generally, and to Asian emerging markets 
in particular.  Since Hong Kong SAR is one of the region's most liquid markets, a reduction in 
Asian regional exposure would trigger sales in Hong Kong's markets, as unwinding of positions 
in other less liquid markets would generate greater pressures on prices. In addition, the Japanese 
yen￿which had been highly correlated with the HSI￿was also at an eight-year low of 147 to 
the U.S. dollar, affecting sentiment towards Asia negatively.  In this regard, the sell-off in Hong 
Kong was part of a general shift away from Asian emerging markets at a time of poor market 
sentiment. 
Based on the market pressures and information on the positions and intentions of a few 
large players, the authorities took the unprecedented step of supporting the equity markets to 
maintain confidence in the economy and the financial system. The HKMA also subsequently 
made changes in the operation of the linked exchange rate system and the Liquidity Adjustment 
Facility to make interest rates less volatile to small shifts in the demand for credit, to strengthen 
the linked exchange rate arrangement. Since the intervention in August, markets have turned 
around remarkably. The HSI index rose 85 percent between September 1998 and June 1999. A 




the Federal Reserve and other central banks in the fall of 1998, the strength of the yen in the 
wake of the deleveraging following the near-collapse of LTCM, and improved sentiment and 




This paper presents a simple linear model of a fixed exchange rate regime and an equity 
market, where speculators have the ability to influence stock market prices through manipulation 
of domestic interest rates, by sudden and large shifts in demand for domestic credit.  Two 
regimes are considered: one in which the monetary authority is forbidden from intervening in 
equity markets, and the second where it can do so as was the case of Hong Kong in August 1998. 
An important conclusion of this paper is that if government equity purchases reduce the 
interest rate under certain circumstances, equity prices face greater downward pressure.  
Furthermore, simultaneously shorting of the money and equity markets could result from an 
increase in the probability that the authorities may abandon the fixed exchange rate and poor 
economic fundamentals.  Some market participants in Hong Kong claimed that this condition 
existed in Hong Kong during the summer of 1998.  Thus, government intervention in the equity 
market may either reduce interest rate or reduce the downward price pressure in equity markets 
but not both. 
In addition to the limitations of equity market interventions in the very short run, 
policymakers should also consider the potentially detrimental long-term consequences.  Most 
notably, such intervention distorts the price mechanism and may also decrease the flow of 




consider such unorthodox measures to alleviate pressure on financial markets during crises, full 






Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale (1992), “Stock-Price Manipulation,” Review of Financial 
Studies, 5(3), 503-29 
 
Bensaid, Bernard and Olivier Jeanne (1997), “The Instability of Fixed Exchange Rate Systems 
when Raising the Nominal Interest Rate Is Costly,” European Economic Review, 41, 1461-78  
 
Drazen, Allan and Paul Masson (1994), “Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of 
Policymakers,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 735-54. 
 
Flood, Robert P., and Peter M. Garber (1984), “Collapsing Exchange-rate Regimes: Some Linear 
Examples,” Journal of International Economics, 17, 1-13. 
 
International Monetary Fund (1999), International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects 
and Key Policy Issues, 92-101. 
 
Jarrow, Robert A. (1992), “Market Manipulation, Bubbles, Corners, and Short Squeezes,” 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 27(3), 311-36. 
 
Krugman, Paul (1979), “A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises,” Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking, 11, 311-25. 
 
Lall, Subir (1997), “Speculative Attacks, Forward Market Intervention, and the Classic Bear 
Squeeze,” IMF Working Paper WP/97/164. 
 
Obstfeld, Maurice (1996), “Models of Currency Crises with Self-fulfilling Features,” European 
Economic Review, 40, 1037-48. 
 
Ozkan, F. Gulcin and Alan Sutherland (1995), “Policy Measures to Avoid a Currency Crisis,” 
Economic Journal, 105, 510-19. 
 
Tsang, Donald (1998), speech at the Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Frankfurt, 
September 29. 
  





  In this appendix, we solve the speculator’s optimization problem when there is no 
government intervention and when the government intervenes.  The first optimization problem 



































































































.      (5) 
subject to: 
C y x £ +  






















































.               





















.                 

















































































a xe f .                     
Note that the first and third second order conditions do not satisfy the sufficient condition 
for a maximum. However, the critical point is a saddle point implying that there is no interior 
solution.  The maximum lies at the boundary. 
 
If we consider the conditions for a double play, namely values of x and y that are strictly 
negative, the optimization problem is bounded from the top by -x $ -C and y = 0, bounded to the 
right by -y $ -C and x = 0, and bounded from the bottom and to the left by y = -x – c.  In the x 
and y plane, the boundary conditions form a triangle where the sides of the triangle are: on the x-
axis from 0 to –C, on the y-axis from 0 to –C, and the diagonal line connecting (-C, 0) and (0, -
C) for nonpositive x and y.  To find the maximum point in this compact set, each leg of this 
triangle needs to be considered.   
 





































Note that x is strictly negative if the term inside the brackets is negative.  Hence, the 





























              (15) 
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t .                 
To find the maximum value of y, differentiate the above with respect to y and set it equal 













.                   
However, this condition is the one identical to the one where there is no profit to be made 







 when x=0 
Hence, the maximum on this frontier is y = 0 and x = 0.  




Because the top frontier is continuous in x where y = 0, the maximum value of these two 
frontiers occurs at x = -C and y = 0 when (15) above is met. Otherwise, profits are zero and no 
positions are taken, i.e. x=0 and y=0. 
  To determine the maximum value on the third frontier, the credit constraint is substituted 
into the speculator’s profit function.  If certain parameter values are satisfied as we will see 




















































































































             
For y to be negative, the terms inside the bracket in the numerator must be positive.  If y 
is negative, x has to be greater than –C.  Since this point is a maximum on this frontier and the 
maximum from the other two frontiers is also on this frontier, neither x nor y are zero. 
 





















































































































C y x £ + . 
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Substituting y into the second condition yields: 
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Similar to the no intervention case, the second order conditions are not satisfied.  Neither 




this critical point is a saddle point.  Thus, there are no interior solutions for this optimization 
problem.  
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